

From WHOIS to WHOWAS:

# A Large-Scale Measurement Study of Domain Registration Privacy Under the GDPR

Chaoyi Lu, Baojun Liu, Yiming Zhang, Zhou Li, Fenglu Zhang, Haixin Duan, Ying Liu, Joann Qionga Chen, Jinjin Liang, Zaifeng Zhang, Shuang Hao and Min Yang



# General Data Protection Regulation

## A high-level framework about protecting personal data

Personal data: information of identifying/identifiable natural person

Protects personal data processing (storage, disclosure, ...)

## Expanded territorial scope

Applies to processing of personal data of subjects in the EU

Regardless of where the processing takes place

## Profound impact on Internet applications

Website cookies, online ads, privacy notices, ...




# Domain Registration (WHOIS) Data

## Personal data of domain holders are *collected*

Names, addresses, phone numbers and emails

Stored by registrars and registries (WHOIS providers)



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Free query-based access via WHOIS protocol

### Domain Information

**Name:** ndss-symposium.org

**Registry Domain ID:** D402200000003323312-LROR

**Nameservers:**

aron.ns.cloudflare.com

yahir.ns.cloudflare.com

**Registry Expiration:** 2021-08-15 17:22:32 UTC

**Updated:** 2020-10-06 14:36:34 UTC

**Created:** 2017-08-15 17:22:32 UTC

### Contact Information

**Registrant:**

**Organization:** Internet Society

**Mailing Address:** Virginia, United States

(Domain registration data of **ndss-symposium.org** acquired from lookup.icann.org on Jan 31, 2021)

# Domain Registration (WHOIS) Data

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## Personal data of domain holders are *published*

Free query-based access via WHOIS protocol

## Heavily relied on by security applications

Domain reputation, spam detection, vulnerability notification...

# When WHOIS Meets GDPR

*“WHOIS”* becomes *“WHOWAS”*

Releasing personal data in WHOIS shall be consented

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## “*WHOIS*” becomes “*WHOWAS*”

Releasing personal data in WHOIS shall be consented

## Guidelines published by ICANN on May 17, 2018

“*Temporary Specification for gTLD Registration Data\**” (TempSpec)

Applies to all gTLD registries and registrars

\* <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/gtld-registration-data-temp-spec-17may18-en.pdf>

# When WHOIS Meets GDPR

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Releasing personal data in WHOIS shall be consented

## Guidelines published by ICANN on May 17, 2018

“*Temporary Specification for gTLD Registration Data\**” (TempSpec)

Applies to all gTLD registries and registrars

### Collection of registration data

Is maintained.

Personal data is still collected  
at domain registration.

### Access to registration data

Is restricted.

Tiered/layered access under  
legitimate purposes.

\* <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/gtld-registration-data-temp-spec-17may18-en.pdf>

# When WHOIS Meets GDPR

## WHOIS publishing requirements of ICANN TempSpec

Replacing personal data with redacted/anonymized values  
Providers decide the scope of data to be protected.

Registration Data Fields	Data Subjects	Data Publishing Requirements
Name, Street, City, Postal Code, Phone, Fax	Registrant, Admin, Tech	1) Provide a <b>redacted value</b> (“ <u>substantially similar</u> ” to “redacted for privacy”), or
Organization, State/Province, Country	Admin, Tech	2) Provide an <b>empty value</b> , or do not provide the fields
Email Address	Registrant, Admin, Tech	Provide an <b>anonymized email address</b> or <b>web form</b> enabling communication with data subject

# Research Questions

## Data Publishing Changes of WHOIS Providers

Are providers compliant to the TempSpec?

How do they redact WHOIS data?

Are there any compliance flaws?

What is the scope of protected domains?

## Security Impact of WHOIS Data Loss

How many security works rely on WHOIS?

Do they use redacted WHOIS data?

What are the security systems used for?

How to remediate the loss of WHOIS?

## **Part I-A:**

# **Data Publishing Changes of WHOIS Providers (Methodology)**

# Methodology: Overview

## Data-driven measurement study

Latitudinal view: covering a wide range of WHOIS providers

Longitudinal view: covering dates before/after GDPR went effective

### A. WHOIS data collection

2-year parsed WHOIS data

### B. Compliance Analysis (GCChecker)

Identify protected/redacted records and give compliance rankings



# Methodology: WHOIS Data Collection

## Challenge: WHOIS ecosystem is fragmented


Hundreds of providers maintain WHOIS servers

Format of WHOIS data is *inconsistent*

## Solution: parsed historical WHOIS dataset from industrial partner

Collects WHOIS of domains observed in its passive DNS

Parsed by *manually-generated templates*



# Methodology: WHOIS Data Collection

## Overview of WHOIS dataset (Jan 2018 ~ Dec 2019)

12% EEA domains; 13% domains older than 10 years

Collected from port 43 of WHOIS servers (not from web WHOIS tools)

Year	Count of				Creation Date		Registrant Region	
	Record	Domain	Region	TLD	~ '09	'10 ~ '19	EEA	Non-EEA
2018	659M	211M	218	758	15.7%	84.3%	12.9%	87.1%
2019	583M	215M	218	754	14.5%	85.5%	12.4%	87.6%
All	1.24B	267M	219	783	13.4%	86.6%	12.2%	87.8%

# Methodology: Compliance Analysis

**Challenge: different wording/language for redaction**

TempSpec do not enforce the use of “*redacted for privacy*”


# Methodology: Compliance Analysis

## Challenge: different wording/language for redaction

TempSpec do not enforce the use of “*redacted for privacy*”

## Solution: unsupervised clustering of WHOIS record groups

Replace records at scale → High textual similarity → Clusters → Few Outliers



# Methodology: Compliance Analysis

## Design of GCChecker

**Grouping WHOIS records:** (*provider, registrant\_region, data\_subject, week*)




# Methodology: Compliance Analysis

## Design of GCChecker

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**Preprocessing:** normalize values, extract TF-IDF features




# Methodology: Compliance Analysis

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**Clustering:** DBSCAN finds outliers, NER refines clusters



# Methodology: Compliance Analysis


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**Provider classification:** rank from on weekly outlier ratios



## **Part I-B:**

# **Data Publishing Changes of WHOIS Providers (Results of 143 large providers)**

# Scale of WHOIS Data Redaction

## Over 85% large WHOIS providers are fully-compliant


Large: as of EEA WHOIS records collected

**Registrars: 73 / 89** (total domain share > 54%)

**Registries: 51 / 54**

## Flawed implementations

- Missing protection of addresses
- Only protecting email addresses
- Others...



WHOIS compliance of EEA records from registrars  
(corresponding with their domain share)

# Timeline of WHOIS Data Redaction


Over 80% fully-compliant providers completed in time

100 / 124 completed before May 25, 2018

Prominent efforts were taken *after* TempSpec (May 17)

Providers lack specific guidelines, thus chose to wait

Only 1 week left for providers to take actions



# Measures of WHOIS Data Redaction

## Contact masking measures

TempSpec: Use redacted value / empty value / privacy protection services

Category	# Provider	Example provider and values
Redacted value	58	ID-69 Tucows Domains Inc. ( <i>“Redacted for privacy”</i> )
		ID-2 Network Solutions, LLC ( <i>“statutory masking enabled”</i> )
		ID-625 Name.com, Inc. ( <i>“non-public data”</i> )
		ID-1505 Gransy, s.r.o. ( <i>“not disclosed”</i> )
Empty value	63	ID-146 GoDaddy.com, LLC; Public Internet Registry (PIR)
Privacy protection	13	ID-1456 NetArt Registrar Sp. z o.o. ( <i>whoisdataprotection.com</i> )

# Measures of WHOIS Data Redaction

## Email anonymization measures

TempSpec: Use web form / anonymized email that facilitate communication

Over 25% fully-compliant registrars *do not* offer such channel

Facilitates Communication	# Registrar	Interface	Example
Yes	42 (72%)	Web form	( <a href="https://www.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx">https://www.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx</a> )
		Email	(f*****7@proxyregistrant.email)
No	21 (28%)	Web	( <a href="https://tieredaccess.com">https://tieredaccess.com</a> )
		Email	(abuse@web.com)

# Scope of WHOIS Data Redaction

**TempSpec lets providers decide what data to protect**

Apply to EEA domains only / Apply in a global basis

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
## TempSpec lets providers decide what data to protect

Apply to EEA domains only / Apply in a global basis

## Most providers sanitize *all* WHOIS data → Bad news for researchers

At least 60% fully-compliant providers apply globally

Causing a global, escalated loss of WHOIS



Comparison of outlier ratio of EEA and non-EEA records

# Scope of WHOIS Data Redaction

## TempSpec lets providers decide what data to protect

Apply to EEA domains only / Apply in a global basis

## Most providers sanitize *all* WHOIS data → Bad news for researchers

At least 60% fully-compliant providers apply globally

Causing a global, escalated loss of WHOIS

## Reasons?

1 week time is short for complete plans

Hard to determine what data is under scope

Saves work to comply with future policies (e.g., CCPA)

**Part II:**

# **Security Impact of WHOIS Data Loss**

# WHOIS in Security Literature

## Security papers published in 15 years of 5 conferences

NDSS, USENIX Security, IEEE S&P, ACM CCS, ACM IMC (2005 ~ 2020)

Download all via custom crawler



NDSS Symposium 2020 Programme Show all


**Extract links to papers**

**FUSE: Finding File Upload Bugs via Penetration Testing**  
Taekjin Lee (KAIST, ETRI), Seongil Wi (KAIST), Suyoung Lee (KAIST), Soeul Son (KAIST)

**Melting Pot of Origins: Compromising the Intermediary Web Services that Rehost Websites**  
Takuya Watanabe (NTT), Eitaro Shioji (NTT), Mitsuaki Akiyama (NTT), Tatsuya Mori (Waseda University), NICT, and RIKEN AIP)

The screenshot shows two paper entries. Each entry has a 'Paper' link highlighted with an orange box. Arrows from the text 'Extract links to papers' point to these 'Paper' links. Each entry also has 'Abstract', 'Slides', and 'Video' links.


<https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-program/2020-program/>



# WHOIS in Security Literature

69% works that use WHOIS rely on redacted data

31 papers covering a wide range of security topics



Classified by security topics


WHOIS Usage	Paper examples
Infer domain ownership / measurement purposes	Halvorson15, Vissers15, Chen16, Liu17
Features for detection	Sivakorn19, Le Pochat20
Vulnerability notification	Stock16, Stock18, Roth20
Result validation	Paxson13, Van Ede20, Delignat-Lavaud14,

# WHOIS in Security Literature

## 69% works that use WHOIS rely on redacted data

31 papers covering a wide range of security topics

Registrant contact and email addresses are frequently used



**Registrant contact: 29 papers (83%)**

**Admin/Tech contact: 15 papers (43%)**

**Email addresses: 26 papers (74%)**

Classified by WHOIS fields

# WHOIS in Security Literature


## Hurdles for security researchers to access WHOIS

Over 70% WHOIS requests from security researchers are rejected\*  
Current tiered systems lack instructions

## Remediation: a better format of tiered access / data redaction

Use RDAP protocol to control access  
Use Fuzzy hashing to replace fixed values  
Review and adjust current security systems

TIERED ACCESS



Sign In

Username

Password

I accept the Tiered Access [Terms of Service](#)

**SIGN IN**

[Forgot Password](#)

### What is Tiered Access?

allows accredited, authenticated users with a legitimate interest to look up registration data (Whois info) for

### How is access granted?

ensure that only those with legitimate purposes, including law enforcement, intellectual property, and commercial

**(Tiered access system of a registrar)**

\* [https://docs.apwg.org/reports/ICANN\\_GDPR\\_WHOIS\\_Users\\_Survey\\_20181018.pdf](https://docs.apwg.org/reports/ICANN_GDPR_WHOIS_Users_Survey_20181018.pdf)

**Part III:**

**Discussion & Summary**

# Discussion

## GDPR's impact on WHOIS is substantial

Most WHOIS providers actively and extensively redact personal data  
A number of security works are affected due to WHOIS loss

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A number of security works are affected due to WHOIS loss

## Lessons learnt: Enforcing privacy policies is still a complex task

TempSpec leaves flexibility for providers, but not enough time  
Checking tools are helpful to identify implementation flaws  
The task requires more efficient collaboration across communities

# Recommendations

## Recommendations to multiple stakeholders

Party	Recommendation
Tech and legal authorities	Allow more lead time for more efficient discussions
Internet Supervisors (e.g. ICANN)	Develop more specific guidelines to avoid confusion
WHOIS providers	Review data protection implementations
Security researchers	Review and adjust security systems that rely on WHOIS

# Compliance Checking Tool

## Help providers check WHOIS compliance status

Location: <https://whoisgdprcompliance.info/>

Provide compliance rank, outlier ratios and domain samples *at request*

Data and rankings updated to Dec 2020 for most providers

**WHOIS Compliance Checking Tool**

Enter WHOIS server and view its weekly outlier ratios and ranking.  
We now have data for 143 providers.


WHOIS Server

**Search**

WHOIS server:

Compliance status: **YES: (Less than 5% EEA records are not protected)**





# Summary

## GDPR's impact is profound on WHOIS

Large WHOIS providers actively and extensively redact WHOIS data

Implementation flaws need to be fixed

The excessive data protection scope causes global WHOIS loss

## A wide range of security works need review or adjustment

Redacted WHOIS data is widely used by security literature

## Lessons learnt

Multiple stakeholders need more efficient collaboration

Release compliance checking tool

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